A recent publication in Foreign Affairs, “India’s Great-Powerful Misconceptions,” offers a candid, if stark, assessment of India’s current trajectory. Penned by Ashley Tellis, a figure who played a significant role in the early 2000s when the US began to engage with a newly nuclear India, the article expresses clear disappointment with India’s current path. Tellis, now affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment, reflects a growing sentiment among some American strategists that India isn’t aligning as expected with US interests, particularly in a world increasingly defined by multipolarity rather than an unconditional alliance.
This critique echoes earlier admissions by American thinkers regarding their long-term strategy toward China, which, instead of fostering an ally, created a strategic competitor. Tellis suggests a similar disillusionment is brewing regarding India. The article, by its very title and content, appears to challenge India’s self-perception as a rising power, questioning its direction and autonomy.
It’s crucial to consider this perspective in the context of India’s current economic standing. By various estimates, the global economy is entering a period of moderation, yet India stands out with consistent annual growth rates of six percent, outpacing even China. India is well aware of its growing influence and potential. However, Tellis’s argument attempts to temper this optimism, asserting that despite its growth, India’s economy is still significantly smaller than China’s and will remain so for decades, implying it cannot truly compete on its own.
The underlying message from US policy, as articulated by Tellis, is clear: India is needed to counterbalance China. Yet, the tone implies a paternalistic expectation that India should align completely with this objective, rather than pursuing its own “strategic autonomy.”
The article also draws a parallel between India’s situation and Australia’s experiences, particularly in the context of its alliance with the United States. It suggests that India is being pushed towards a similar model of partnership, exemplified by Australia’s deep military alignment with the US.
Adding another layer to this discussion, Gareth Evans, Australia’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1988-1996) and a founding father of APEC, offers a striking perspective in the South China Morning Post. He discusses the unraveling of the AUKUS project, which aimed for Australia to acquire at least eight nuclear submarines over three decades to “contain” China.
Evans reveals that the Trump administration’s review of AUKUS, led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby—a known critic of the project—exposed its flaws. Evans now suggests that the funds allocated for AUKUS could be better utilized, arguing that Australia was persuaded to invest billions in American and British shipyards that required investment. He further implies that in a few decades, the nature of warfare might render these submarines largely obsolete.
Evans shares two particularly poignant thoughts that resonate with India’s predicament. First, he recalls his own “not very pleasant” experience as a junior ally during the 1991 Gulf War. Second, he highlights the “insane irony” of Australia spending vast sums to acquire defense capabilities against threats that largely arose precisely because Australia was acquiring those capabilities in support of the United States, and without any guarantees of reciprocal support.
These articles offer valuable insights into the shifting geopolitical landscape. They highlight how traditional alliances are being re-evaluated, and how nations like India and Australia are navigating their strategic interests amidst evolving global power dynamics. The discussions reveal a sense of disillusionment and a search for new paradigms as established norms are challenged.